Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a few simple settings. Computational approaches to the problem through the use of LPs have their own set of limitations. Building on the success of deep learning, a new approach was recently proposed by Dütting et al. (2017) in which the auction is modeled by a feed-forward neural network and the design problem is framed as a learning problem. The neural architectures used in that work are general purpose and do not take advantage of any of the symmetries the problem could present, such as permutation equivariance. In this work, we consider auction design problems that have permutation-equivariant symmetry and construct a neural architecture that is capable of perfectly recovering the permutationequivariant optimal mechanism, which we show is not possible with the previous architecture. We demonstrate that permutation-equivariant architectures are not only capable of recovering previous results, they also have better generalization properties.
Introduction
A growing number of methods in machine learning fit into the game-theoretic framework. This includes optimizing over multiple interacting objectives as in generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014) or designing algorithms using game-theoretic tools as in multi-agent reinforcement learning (Lanctot et al., 2017) . A central question in game theory is predicting the behavior of an agent. An equally intriguing question is the inverse of the above: how can we induce strategic agents to behave in a certain way? Surprisingly, in machine learning, this question has received much less attention than its famous counterpart. Only a few works got interested in this question such as Yu et al. (2019) in multi-agent reinforcement learning. In Economics, however, Mechanism Design is a core domain of study, and auction design is itself a core focus therein.
Following seminal work of Vickrey (Vickrey, 1961) and Myerson (Myerson, 1981) , auctions are typically studied in the independent private valuations model: each bidder has a valuation function over items, and their payoff depends only on the items they receive. Moreover, the auctioneer knows aggregate information about the population that each bidder comes from, modeled as a distribution over valuation functions, but does not know precisely each bidder's valuation (outside of any information provided by this Bayesian prior). A major difficulty in designing auctions is that valuations are private and bidders need to be incentivized to report their valuations truthfully.
The goal of the auctioneer is to design an incentive compatible auction that maximizes revenue. Myerson resolved the optimal auction design problem when there is a single item for sale (Myerson, 1981) . However, the problem is not completely understood even in the extremely simple setting with just a single bidder and two items. While there have been some partial characterizations Vincent, 2006, 2010; Pavlov, 2011; Wang and Tang, 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2017b) , and algorithmic solutions with provable guarantees (Alaei, 2011; Alaei et al., 2012 Alaei et al., , 2013 Cai et al., 2012a,b) , neither the analytic nor algorithmic approach currently appears tractable for seemingly small instances. This is not surprising: optimal auctions, even for just a single bidder (with multiple items), are known to be computationally intractable, and suffer from other formal measures of complexity (Daskalakis et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014 Chen et al., , 2015 Chen et al., , 2018 Hart and Reny, 2015; Thanassoulis, 2004) .
A recent line of work to confront this theoretical hurdle consists in building deep learning architectures that design auctions from samples of bidder valuations. Dütting et al. (2017) proposed a feed-forward architecture to find near-optimal results in several known multi-item settings and obtain new mechanisms in unknown cases. Feng et al. (2018) extends this approach to budget constrained bidders and Golowich et al. (2018) to the facility location problem. Recently, Tacchetti et al. (2019) proposed a new architecture that restricts the learned mechanism to the class of VCG auctions (Vickrey, 1961) . However, in some cases, the optimal mechanism is known to be not VCG-based; counter-examples can be found in Manelli and Vincent (2006) ; Daskalakis et al. (2017a) ; Thanassoulis (2004) ; Pavlov (2011) . All these works tend to highlight how deep learning is useful for designing auctions.
Like typical domains, optimality is of course a first-order concern in auction design as well, and the architecture of Dütting et al. (2017) performs well in this regard. However, simplicity is also a first-order concern in auction design for various reasons. Consider for example the difference between an auction which treats bidders differently based on their identity, versus one which does not (called anonymous, or bidder-symmetric). Beyond simplicity of implementation, anonymous auctions avoid challenging legal or fairness issues, and are desirable objects of study even when they are suboptimal (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009; Alaei et al., 2015) . Consider also the difference between an auction which offers every distinct bundle of (say) five items at a different price, versus one which offers (say) "sets of size five" at a single price (called item-symmetric). Item-symmetric auctions are desirable from the perspective of transparency to the buyer, and are again desirable objects of study even when suboptimal (Kothari et al., 2019) .
Putting aside the issue of trading off symmetry versus optimality, it seems uncontroversial that symmetry and optimality is more desirable than optimality alone, and that this distinction is first order. In many domains of interest, optimal mechanisms are indeed known to be symmetric (for example, if the distribution itself is symmetric, or whenever it is optimal to sell only the grand bundle of all items). Yet, we show in §4 that feed-forward architectures struggle to find symmetric auctions, even when the optimum is symmetric. To be clear, the architecture's performance is indeed quite close to optimal, but not "close to symmetric." Simply put, the goal of this paper is to design an architecture which guarantees symmetry by design.
Another benefit of this approach is generalization. Because we use minimal domain knowledge in a way that does not sacrifice optimality, our architecture converges to the optimum with fewer samples. Additionally, our architecture does not require hard-coding the number of bidders or items during training -training our architecture on instances with n bidders and m items produces a well-defined auction even for instances with n bidders and m items. Somewhat surprisingly, we show in §5 some examples where our architecture trained on 1 bidder with 5 items generalizes well even to 1 bidder and m items, for any m ∈ {2, 10}.
Contributions
This paper presents a neural network architecture that outputs symmetric auctions. This architecture is parameter-efficient and recovers all the optimal results in the symmetric auctions literature. More specifically, our paper decomposes as follows:
- §3 introduces the standard notions of auction design.
- §4 first shows that feed-forward networks rarely find a symmetric solution, even in settings where the optimal auction is symmetric. Using techniques from (Hartford et al., 2018) , we build permutation-equivariant architectures to encode symmetric auctions.
- §5 presents numerical evidence for the effectiveness of our approach. In particular, we underline its generalization capacity and its performance even with asymmetric input distributions.
Related work
Auction design and machine learning. Machine learning and computational learning theory have been used in several ways to design auctions from samples of bidder valuations. One line of research consists in analyzing the sample complexity of designing optimal revenue-maximizing auctions. This includes the framework of single-parameter settings (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Huang et al., 2018; Hartline and Taggart, 2019; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Guo et al., 2019) , multi-item auctions (Dughmi et al., 2014; Gonczarowski and Weinberg, 2018) , combinatorial auctions (Balcan et al., 2016; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016; Syrgkanis, 2017) and allocation mechanisms (Narasimhan and Parkes, 2016) . Other works have leveraged machine learning to optimize different aspects of mechanisms (Lahaie, 2011; Dütting et al., 2015) . Our work differs from these lines and belongs to the direction of using deep learning for auction design.
Algorithmic Approaches to Auction Design. For the problem we study (multi-bidder, multiitem, additive buyers, independent item values), a poly-time constant-factor approximation was first discovered by Yao (2015) . This result builds on earlier tools of Chawla et al. (2010) ; Hart and Nisan (2012) ; Li and Yao (2013) ; Babaioff et al. (2014) for related settings, and was later improved and extended in (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Chawla and Miller, 2016; Cai and Zhao, 2017) . Even the single-bidder problem is known to be computationally intractable, unless P #P ⊆ ZP P (Daskalakis et al., 2014) . When the items are i.i.d. a series of works Cai et al., 2012a,b) provides a poly-time algorithm assuming the marginals have finite support and explicitly given as input. Their approach gives a PTAS for continuous distributions. Their tools have been used to give a QPTAS even for non-i.i.d. instances for a single bidder in a related setting (Kothari et al., 2019) . Despite the theoretical guarantees of these works, the algorithms runtime is prohibitive in practice: these algorithms solve large (but still poly-sized) linear programs. The easiest comparison between our work and the constant-factor approximations is simply that our work approximates the optimum arbitrarily well. In comparison to the optimal/near-optimal algorithms, our work is significantly faster in practice, although without theoretical guarantees. Wilson (1986) , auctioneers aim to design auctions which are as simple as possible, while sacrificing as little in optimality as possible. One way in which an auction can be simple is if it is anonymous (invariant under permutations of bidders), and a study of such auctions, even in settings in which they are provably suboptimal, dates back at least to seminal work of Hartline and Roughgarden (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009; Alaei et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2019a Jin et al., , 2018 Jin et al., , 2019b . Another way an auction can be simple is if it is simple to describe the options to buyers, perhaps because the auction is invariant under permutations of items. This property has been exploited to design faster algorithms in the case when item distributions are themselves invariant under permutations of items, but also in general Kothari et al., 2019) .
Symmetries in auctions. Following the Wilson Doctrine
Invariance and equivariance in deep learning. Many tasks require learning functions that are invariant or equivariant to certain symmetries of the input. The simplest example is translation invariance of Convolutional Neural Networks (LeCun et al., 1989) . Recently, this idea has been generalized to other types of continuous symmetries such as rotational symmetries (Cohen and Welling, 2016; Weiler et al., 2018; , or discrete permutation symmetries through graph neural networks (Scarselli et al., 2008; Bronstein et al., 2017; Kipf and Welling, 2016; Zaheer et al., 2017; Maron et al., 2018) . Regarding equivariance, showed that any equivariant layer is equivalent to a certain parameter sharing scheme. Exploiting this idea, Hartford et al. (2018) design such a scheme and prove that it could not be made more expressive without violating permutation equivariance. We use this scheme to design our deep permutation-equivariant architecture for auctions.
Symmetries and approximations in auction design
We first review the framework of auction design and the problem of finding truthful mechanisms. We then present symmetric auctions and underline the equivariance properties problem. Lastly, similarly to Dütting et al. (2017) , we frame auction design as a learning problem.
Auction design and symmetries
Auction design. We consider the setting of additive auctions with n bidders with N = {1, . . . , n} and m items with M = {1, . . . , m}. Each bidder i is has value v ij for item j, and values the set S of items at j∈S v ij . Such valuations are called additive, and are perhaps the most well-studied valuations in multi-item auction design Nisan, 2012, 2013; Li and Yao, 2013; Babaioff et al., 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2014; Hart and Reny, 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Daskalakis et al., 2017b; Beyhaghi and Weinberg, 2019) .
The designer does not know V = (v ij ) i∈N,j∈M , but just a distribution from which they are drawn. Specifically, v i = (v i1 , . . . , v im ) is drawn from a distribution D i over R m , and denotes the valuation vector of bidder i for each of the m items (and then the full valuation profile V is drawn from D := × i D i ). In what follows, we abuse notation V ∈ D to mean that V ∈ Supp(D), where Supp(D) denotes the support of the distribution D. The designer designs an auction, which asks the bidders to report their valuations (potentially untruthfully), then decides on an allocation of items to the bidders and charges a payment to them.
Definition 1. An auction is a pair (g, p) consisting of a randomized allocation rule g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) where g i : R n×m → [0, 1] m and payment rules p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) where p i : R n×m → R 0 (where for all V , and all j, i (g i (V )) j 1).
Given reported bids B = (b ij ) i∈N,j∈M , the auction computes an allocation probability g(B) and payments p(B). [g i (B)] j is the probability that bidder i received object j and p i (B) is the price bidder i has to pay to the mechanism. In what follows, M denotes the class of all possible auctions.
Definition 2. The utility of bidder i is defined by
Bidders are strategic and seek to maximize their utility and therefore may report bids that are different from their valuations. Let V −i denote the valuation profile without element v i , similarly for B −i and let D −i = × j =i D j denote the possible valuation profiles of bidders other than bidder i. We aim at auctions that lead bidders to bid their true valuations which is formalized by the notion of incentive compatibility. 
Additionally, we aim at auctions where each bidder receives a non-negative utility.
In a DSIC auction, the bidders have the incentive to truthfully report their valuations and therefore, the revenue on valuation profile V is defined as n i=1 p i (V ). Optimal auction design aims at finding a DSIC auction that maximizes the expected revenue rev :
Symmetric auctions. We frame the problem of optimal auction design as an optimization problem where we seek an auction that minimizes −rev among all auctions that satisfy IR and DSIC. To enforce this latter, we use the notion of ex-post regret for each bidder to measure the extent to which an auction violates DSIC.
Definition 5. The ex-post regret for a bidder i is the maximum increase in his utility when considering all his possible bids and fixing the bids of others. More formally, for a valuation profile V , the ex-post regret for a bidder i is
In particular, DSIC is equivalent to
Therefore, by setting (IC) and (IR) as constraints, finding an optimal auction is equivalent to the following linear program
(LP) is intractable due to the exponential number of constraints. However, in the setting of symmetric auctions, it is possible to reduce the search space of the problem as shown in Theorem 1. We define before bidder-and item-symmetries.
Definition 6. The valuation distribution D is bidder-symmetric if for any permutation of the bidders
Bidder symmetry intuitively means that the bidders are a priori indistinguishable (although individual bidders will be different). For example, perhaps all the designer knows is that each bidder is a consumer in the US. Then each consumer is drawn from the same distribution, although the particular consumers drawn are indeed distinct. This holds for instance in auctions where the identity of the bidders is anonymous, or if D i = D j for all i, j (bidders are i.i.d.).
Intuitively, item-symmetry means that the items are a priori indistinguishable, but not identical. For example, the items could be different colors of a car (so an individual buyer might strongly prefer red to blue cars, but there is nothing a priori more valuable about a red versus blue car). It holds when the distributions over the items are i.i.d. but this is not a necessary condition. Indeed,
Definition 8. An auction is symmetric if its valuation distributions are bidder-and item-symmetric.
Examples of symmetric auctions include the independent private valuations model (D i 's are i.i.d). We now define the notion of permutation-equivariance that is important in symmetric auctions.
Definition 9. The functions g and p are permutation-equivariant if for any two permutation matrices Π n ∈ {0, 1} n×n and Π m ∈ {0, 1} m×m , and any valuation matrix V , we have:
Theorem 1. When the auction is symmetric, there exists an optimal solution to (LP) that is permutation-equivariant.
Proof. Here is a high level sketch of the proof, the complete proof can be found in the Appendix.
Let (g, p) be an optimal solution to the problem. Let Π n and Π m be two permutation matrices, we define:
. The proof consists in the following steps:
1-For all permutations Π n , Π m , (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ) is also an optimal solution. 2-The space of optimal solutions is convex and the functions (g,p) defined by:
is also an optimal solution. The expectation is taken over permutations matrices Π n and Π m uniformly at random. 3-g andp are equivariant functions.
Theorem 1 encourages to reduce the search space in (LP) by only optimizing over permutationequivariant allocations and payments. We implement this idea in Section 4 where we build equivariant neural network architectures. Before, we frame auction design as a learning problem.
Auction design as a learning problem
Similarly to Dütting et al. (2017) , we formulate auction design as a learning problem. We aim at learning a parametric set of auctions by (g w , p w ) for parameters w ∈ R d for some d ∈ N. Solving directly (LP) is challenging in practice. Indeed, it requires for the auctioneer to use unavailable information to her as the bidders valuations and the valuation distribution D. Therefore, we modify the first constraint in (LP) by instead considering the expect ex-post regret that is
The expectation terms are computed by sampling bidder valuation profiles S = { v (1) , . . . , v (L) } drawn i.i.d. from D. Therefore, given the sample S, we estimate the empirical ex-post regret for bidder i as
where
. Therefore, the learning formulation of (LP) is
( LP) Dütting et al. (2017) justify the validity of this reduction from (LP) to ( LP) by showing that the gap between the expected regret and the empirical regret is small as the number of samples increases. Additionally to being DSIC, the auction must satisfy IR. The learning problem ( LP) does not ensure this but we will show how to include this requirement in the architecture in Section 4.
Permutation-equivariant neural network architecture
We first motivate our approach by showing how feed-forward architectures may struggle to find a permutation-equivariant solution in symmetric auctions. We then describe our neural network architecture for modeling symmetric multi-item auctions. The main ingredient in this architecture is the exchangeable matrix layer introduced by Hartford et al. (2018) .
Feed-forward nets and permutation-equivariance
We demonstrate here that fully connected architectures struggle to find permutation-equivariant solutions. We use the architecture and training procedure proposed by Dütting et al. (2017) for our experiments.
Permutation-sensitivity. Given L bidders valuation samples {B (1) , . . . , B (L) } ∈ R n×m , we generate for each bid matrix B ( ) all its possible permutations B ( ) Πn,Πm := Π n B ( ) Π m , where Π n ∈ {0, 1} n×n and Π m ∈ {0, 1} m×m are permutation matrices. We then compute the revenue for each one of these bid matrices and obtain a revenue matrix R ∈ R n!m!×L . Finally, we compute
The distribution described by the entries of h R gives a measure of how close the auction is to permutation-equivariance. A symmetric mechanism satisfies h R = (0, . . . , 0) .
(I) Single bidder with additive valuations over two items where the item values are drawn from U[0, 1]. The optimal auction is given by Manelli and Vincent (2006) . Fig. 1 (a) -(b) presents the distribution of h R of the optimal auction learned for setting (I) when varying the number of samples L. The optimal revenue for that setting is 0.55. When L is large, the distribution is almost concentrated at zero and therefore the network is almost able to recover the permutation-equivariant solution. However, as L decreases, h R is less concentrated around zero and the solution obtained becomes increasingly non permutation-equivariant.
This lack of permutation-invariance becomes more dramatic when the dimensions of the problem increase. Fig. 1 (b) presents the distribution of h R for the optimal auction mechanism learned for setting (II) when trained with 5 × 10 5 samples. Contrary to (I), almost no entry of h R is located around zero. The entries are concentrated around between 0.2 and 0.6 which is not insignificant: these numbers correspond to 7% and 21% of the estimated optimal revenue for that setting.
Exploitability. Finally, to highlight how important equivariant solutions are, we analyze the worst revenue loss that the auctioneer can incur when the bidders act adversarially. Indeed, since different permutations can result in different revenues for the auction, cooperative bidders could pick among the n! possible permutations of their labels the one that minimized the revenue of the mechanism and present themselves in that order. Instead of getting a revenue of
The percentage of revenue loss is given by l = 100 × Ropt−R adv Ropt . We study this loss, l in in the following family of settings: (III n ) n additive bidders and ten item where the item values are drawn from U[0, 1]. The results can be seen in Fig. 1 (c) when we plot l(n) the loss in revenue as a function of n. As the number of bidders increases, the loss becomes more substantial getting over the 8% with only 6 bidders. Permutation-sensitivity and exploitability of fully connected architectures highlight the importance of obtaining symmetric auctions. To this end, we design a permutation-equivariant architecture.
Permutation-equivariant network
We are given a matrix B = (b i,j ) ∈ R n×m , where b i,j is the bid of player i for item j. In symmetric auctions, B is an exchangeable matrix: any row-and column-wise permutation of B represents the same bids. We want to implement a randomized allocation neural network g w : R n×m → [0, 1] n×m and a payment network p w : R n×m → R n 0 . Exchangeability of B and Theorem 1 motivates to set g w and p w as permutation-equivariant functions.
To build our permutation-equivariant networks, we rely on the exchangeable matrix layers introduced by (Hartford et al., 2018) , that are a generalization of the deep sets architecture (Zaheer et al., 2017) . We briefly describe this architecture here and invite the reader to look at the original paper for more details.
The architecture has the same structure as a convolutional network: it consists in several layers and each of them is constituted of multiple channels. Each layer takes as input K channels and outputs O channels. Let B (k) and Y (o) denote such channels. Cross-channel interactions are fully connected: we have five unique parameters w for each combination of input-output channels and the bias parameter w 5 does not depend on the input. The element (i, j) of the o-th output channel is
(1)
Each layer preserves permutation-equivariance since we only apply sums over lines and columns of X (k) in (1). By stacking multiple layers (1), we build a deep permutation-equivariant network.
Architecture for symmetric auctions
We describe the main components of the allocation and payment networks. The architecture consists in three components Fig. 2 .
The first network outputs a vector where the entry q w j (B) is the probability that item j is allocated to any of the n bidders. The architecture of q w consists of three modules. The first one is a deep permutation-equivariant network with tanh as activation functions. The output of that module is a matrix Q ∈ R n×m . The second module transforms Q into a vector R m by taking the average over the rows of Q. We finally apply the sigmoid function to the result to ensure that q w (B) ∈ [0, 1] m . This architecture preserves equivariance with respect to bidder and items permutations since Q is permutation-equivariant and we average over Q's rows.
The second network outputs a matrix where h w ij is the probability that item j is allocated to bidder i conditioned on item j being allocated. The architecture of h w consists of a deep permutationequivariant network with tanh activation functions followed by softmax activation function so that n i=1 h w ij (B) = 1. This architecture ensures that q w equivariant with respect to object and bidder permutations. Finally, by combining the outputs of q w and h w , we compute the allocation function g w : R n×m → [0, 1] n×m where g ij (B) is the probability that the allocated item j is given to bidder i. Indeed, using conditional probabilities, we have g w ij (B) = q w j (B)h w ij (B). Note that g w is a permutation-equivariant function since it is obtained as a product of permutation-equivariant functions.
The third network outputs a vector wherep w i is the fraction of bidder's i utility that she has to pay to the mechanism. Mathematically, given the allocation function g w , bidder i has to pay an amount p i given by p i =p i (B) m j=1 g w ij (B)B ij . Individual rationality is ensured by havingp i ∈ [0, 1]. The architecture ofp w is almost similar to the one of q w . Instead of averaging over the rows of the matrix output by the permutation-equivariant architecture, we average over the columns.
Optimization and training
The optimization and training procedure of our permutation-equivariant networks is similar to Dütting et al. (2017) . For this reason, we just briefly mention the outline of this procedure and remind the details in App. B for completeness. We apply the augmented Lagrangian method to solve the constrained training problem (R) over the space of parameters w. The Lagrangian with a quadratic penalty is given by:
where λ ∈ R n is a vector of Lagrange multipliers and ρ > 0 is a fixed parameter controlling the weight of the quadratic penalty. The solver alternates between the updates on the model parameters and the Lagrange multipliers: (a) w new ∈ argmax w L ρ (w old , λ old ) and (b) λ new i = λ old i + ρ rgt i (w new ), ∀i ∈ N.
Experimental Results
We start by showing the effectiveness of our architecture in symmetric and asymmetric multiitem auctions. We then highlight its sample-efficiency for training and its ability to extrapolate to other settings.
Setup. We implemented our experiments using PyTorch. A typical deep exchangeable network consists of 3 hidden layers of 25 channels each. Depending on the experiment, we generated a dataset of {5000, 50000, 500000} valuation profiles and chose mini batches of sizes {50, 500, 5000} for training. The optimization of the augmented Lagrangian was typically run for {50, 80} epochs. The value of ρ in the augmented Lagrangian was set to 1.0 and incremented every 2 epochs. An update on w t was performed for every mini-batch using the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. For each update w t , we ran R = 25 misreport update steps with a learning rate of 0.001. An update on λ t was performed once every 100 minibatches.
Evaluation. In addition to the revenue of the learned auction on a test set, we also evaluate the corresponding empirical average regret over bidders rgt = 1 n n i=1 rgt i . We evaluate these terms by running gradient ascent on v i with a step-size of 0.001 for {300, 500} iterations (we test {100, 300} different random initial v i and report the one achieves the largest regret).
Settings with equivariant optimal solution. We first consider instances of the single bidder multi-item auctions where the optimal mechanism solution is known to be equivariant. If it is not surprising for settings such as (I) because of the item symmetry, it is surprising that the following item asymmetric setting does belong to that category:
(IV) Single additive bidder and two items where the item values are independently drawn according to the probability densities f 1 (x) = 5/(1 + x) 6 and f 2 (y) = 6/(1 + y) 7 . The optimal auction is given by Daskalakis et al. (2017b) .
In Fig. 3(a) we report the revenue and regret of the mechanism learned by our model. The revenue is very close to the optimal revenue, and the regret is negligible. In some cases the learned auction achieves a revenue slightly above the optimal incentive compatible auction. This is possible because the regret, even though it is small, is non-zero. Fig. 3(c) presents a plot of revenue and regret as a function of training epochs for the setting (I).
Settings with unknown optimal solution. Our architecture is also able to recover a permutationequivariant solution in settings for which the optimum is not known analytically. We consider the following setting: We compare our solution to the optimal auctions from the VVCA and AMA bsym families of incentive compatible auctions from (Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015) . Fig. 3(b) summarizes our results.
Settings with non-equivariant optimal solution. Our permutation-equivariant architecture returns satisfactory results in asymmetric auctions. We study a setting where there may not be permutation-equivariant solutions.
(VI) Two additive bidders and two items where the item values are independently drawn according to the probability densities f 1 (x) = λ −1 1 e −λ 1 x and f 2 (y) = λ −1 2 e −λ 2 y , where λ 1 , λ 2 > 0. Fig. 4(b) shows the revenue and regret of the final auctions learned for setting (VI). When λ 1 = λ 2 , the auction is symmetric and so, the revenue of the learned auction is very close to the optimal revenue, with negligibly small regret. However, as we increase the gap between λ 1 and λ 2 , the asymmetry becomes dominant and the optimal auction does not satisfy permutation-equivariance. Nonetheless, we remark that our architecture does output a solution with near-optimal revenue and small regret.
Sample-efficiency. Our permutation-equivariant architecture exhibits solid generalization properties when compared to a fully connected architecture. When enough data is available at training, both architecture generalize well to unseen data and the gap between the training and test losses goes to zero as one would expect for both architectures. However in the regime where few training samples are available, the equivariant architecture generalizes while the fully connected one struggles to. We demonstrate that in the context of setting (V) with a training set of 20 samples by plotting the training and test losses as a function of time (measures in epochs) for both architectures. The results can be found in Fig. 4(a) . Out-of-setting generalization. The number of parameters in permutation-equivariant architecture does not depend on the size of the input. Given an architecture that was trained on samples of size (n, m), it is possible to evaluate it on samples of any size (n , m ). This evaluation is not well defined for fully connected architectures where the dimension of the weights depends on the input size. We use this advantage to check if models trained in a fixed setting, perform well in totally different ones.
(α) Train an equivariant architecture on 1 bidder, 5 items and test it on 1 bidder, n items for n = 2 · · · 10. All the items values are sampled independently from U[0, 1].
(β) Train an equivariant architecture on 2 bidders, 3 objects and test it on 2 bidders, n objects for n = 2 · · · 6. All the items values are sampled independently from U[0, 1]. Fig. 4(c)-(d) reports the test revenue that we get for different values of n in (α) and (β) and compares it to the empirical optimal revenue. Surprisingly, our model does generalize well. It is worth mentioning that knowing how to solve a larger problem such as 1x5 does not automatically result in a capacity to solve a smaller one such as 1x2; the generalization does happen on both ends. Our approach looks promising regarding out of setting generalization. It generalize well when the number of objects varies and the number of bidders remain constants. However, generalization to settings where the number of bidders varies is more difficult due to the complex interactions between bidders. We do not observe good generalization with our current method.
Conclusion
We have explored the effect of adding domain knowledge in neural network architectures for auction design. We built a permutation-equivariant architecture to design symmetric auctions and highlighted its multiple advantages. It recovers several known optimal results and provides competitive results in asymmetric auctions. Compared to fully connected architectures, it is more sample efficient and is able to generalize to settings it was not trained on. In a nutshell, this paper insists on the importance of bringing domain-knowledge to the deep learning approaches for auctions.
Our architecture presents some limitations. It assumes that all the bidders and items are permutation-equivariant. However, in some real-world auctions, the item/bidder-symmetry only holds for a group of bidders/items. More advanced architectures such as Equivariant Graph Networks (Maron et al., 2018) may solve this issue. Another limitation is that we only consider additive valuations. An interesting direction would be to extend our approach to other settings as unit-demand or combinatorial auctions.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Notation: For a matrix B ∈ R nm we will denote the ith line by B i ∈ R m or [B] i ∈ R m . Let D denote an equivariant distribution on R nm . Let g : R nm → R nm and p : R nm → R n be solutions to the following problem:
Let Π n and Π m be two permutation matrices of sizes n and m. In particular Π n and Π m are orthogonal matrices and in the following we use that Π −1 n = Π T n and Π −1 m = Π T m . Let's define: p) is a solution to the problem then so is (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ). First we show that (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ) still satisfy the previous constraints.
Let's denote by ϕ the permutation on the indices corresponding to the Π n permutation. then we have:
This gives us that:
This shows that (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ) satisfies the first constraint. We now move to the second constraint.
Let's writeB = (B i , B −i ). As a reminder, this is the matrix B where the ith line has been replaced with B i . We need to show that:
Using the previous computations we find that:
where ϕ is the permutation associated with Π n . Since g and p satisfy the second constraint we have:
This concludes the proof that (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ) satisfy the constraints. Now we have to show that p Πn,Πm is optimal.
where we used that Π −1 n = Π T n , Π n 1 = 1 and that Π n B Π m ∼ D since D is an equivariant distribution.
This shows that if p is optimal then p Πn,Πm is also optimal since they have the same expectation. We conclude that (g Πn,Πm , p Πn,Πm ) is an optimal solution.
Let's defineg (B) = E Πn,Πm g Πn,Πm (B) p(B) = E Πn,Πm p Πn,Πm (B) .
Here, in the expectation, Π n and Π m are drawn uniformly at random. Since the problem and constraints are convex, (g,p) is also an optimal solution to the problem as a convex combination of optimal solutions. Let's prove thatg andp are equivariant functions.
If Π n and Π m are uniform among permutation then so is Π n Π n and Π m Π m . So through a change of variable we find that:
include implementation details here for completeness and additional details can be found in the original paper. We generate a training data set of valuation profiles S that we then divide into mini-batches of size B. Typical sizes for S are {5000, 50000, 500000} and typical batch sizes are {50, 500, 50000}. We train our networks over for several epochs (typically {50, 80}) and we apply a random shuffling of the training data for each new epoch. We denote the minibatch received at iteration t by S t = {u (1) , . . . , u (B) }. The update on model parameters involves an unconstrained optimization of L ρ over w and is performed using a gradient-based optimizer. Let rgt i (w) be the empirical regret in (R) computed on mini-batch S t . The gradient of L ρ with respect to w is given by:
The terms rgt i and g ,i requires us to compute the maximum over misreports for each bidder i and valuation profile . To compute this maximum we optimize the function v
) using another gradient based optimizer.
For each i and valuation profile , we maintain a misreports valuation v i ( ) . For every update on the model parameters w t , we perform R gradient updates to compute the optimal misreports: v i ( ) = v i ( ) + γ∇ v i ( ) u w i (v and γ = 0.001 for the training phase. During testing, we use a larger number of step sizes R test to compute these optimal misreports and we try bigger number initialization, N init , that are drawn from the same distribution of the valuations. Typical values are R test = {200, 300} and N init = {100, 300}.
When the valuations are constrained to an interval (for instance [0, 1]), this optimization inner loop becomes constrained and we make sure that the values we get for v i are realistic by projecting them to their domain after each gradient step. The parameters λ t and ρ t in the Lagrangian are not constant but they are updated over time. ρ t is initialized at a value ρ 0 is incremented every T ρ iterations, ρ t+1 ← ρ t + c. Typical values are ρ 0 = {0.25, 1}, c = {0.25, 1, 5} and T ρ = {2, 5} epochs. λ t is initialized at a value λ 0 is updates every T λ iterations according to λ t+1 i ← λ t i + ρ t rgt i (w t ), ∀i ∈ N . Typical values are λ 0 i = {0.25, 1, 5} and T λ = {2} iterations.
